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Incentive awards to representative plaintiffs in class actions have been the
focus of recent law reform efforts and have generated inconsistent case law. But
little is known about such awards. This study of 374 opinions from 1993 to 2002
finds that awards were granted in about 28 percent of settled class actions. The rate
of awards varied by case category as follows: consumer credit actions 59 percent,
employment discrimination cases 46 percent, antitrust cases 35 percent, securities
cases 24 percent (before the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
limited awards), and corporate and mass tort actions less than 10 percent. The
decision to grant an incentive award was associated with increased awards of
attorneys' costs and expenses (our proxy for representative-plaintiff costs) in
relation to median class-member recoveries and with the case being in federal court.
When given, incentive awards constituted, on average, 0. 16 percent of the
class recovery, with a median of 0.02 percent. Award levels varied by case category.
Employment discrimination cases had large incentive awards compared to other
categories. Award size was associated with the case's costs and expenses, the class
recovery amount, the median recovery per class member, the case's risk, and the
presence of objection to the settlement. Awards exhibited a scaling effect; their per-
centage of the class recovery decreased as the class recovery increased.
We examine the data in light of four hypotheses about the function of
incentive awards: (1) reimbursing class representatives for nonpecuniary litigation
costs; (2) rewarding class representatives for superior service; (3) facilitating self-
interested behavior by class counsel; and (4) achieving proportionality between
awards and other outcomes in the case. We find support for the reimbursement and
proportionality hypotheses and weaker support for the attorney self-interest and
reward-for-service hypotheses. We find little evidence of systematic abuse in incentive
awards. Given the modest frequency and size of awards, and their possible benefits,
case-by-case adjudication may be more appropriate than fixed legislative or judicial
rules banning awards.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Class actions are useful procedures for achieving economies of scale in
litigation, enhancing the enforcement of laws, and deterring misconduct that
adversely affects the interests of multiple parties As has long been recognized,
these cases tend to be dominated by entrepreneurial attorneys who effectively
control all phases of the litigation] The "named" or "representative"
plaintiff, who supposedly acts as the champion of the class, is sometimes little
more than an eponym.3 Yet, despite suggestions that class action procedures
should dispense with the named plaintiff as a meaningless figurehead,4 at least
in large-scale, small-claim cases, the trend of the law, if anything, has been to
1. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions, in I NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 257 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
2. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
3. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
633, 633-34 (2003).
4. See Jean Wegman Bums, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in
Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165 (1990).
5. See Macey & Miller, supra note 2.
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the contrary. The named plaintiff remains an essential prerequisite in all
class cases. And in one context-private federal securities fraud cases-the
named plaintiff has been assigned a significantly enhanced role. In the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),6 Congress greatly
increased the role and responsibilities of the named plaintiff in the selection
and monitoring of class counsel.
Named plaintiffs incur costs in performing their role. Even "figurehead"
plaintiffs incur the costs of learning about the case, as they must display some
familiarity with and responsibility for the case in order to satisfy the "adequacy"
requirement of the relevant class action rule.' Defendants also typically take
the deposition of the named plaintiff-an experience that can be time consum-
ing and stressful to someone not familiar with the legal process. The named
plaintiff may have to comply with burdensome or intrusive discovery
requests. Named plaintiffs also run a slight, but potentially worrisome, risk of
being saddled with sanctions if the litigation turns out badly.8 These costs
can be significantly greater when the named plaintiff assumes a more active
role in selecting or supervising counsel, as in the case of private securities
litigation. In some cases-"pattern or practice" employment discrimination
actions being paradigmatic-the named plaintiff may also experience costs in
the form of retaliation or loss of reputation.
Named plaintiffs also gain benefits from performing their role. These
may include psychic benefits such as the pleasure of having their name on the
"marquee," being catered to by counsel, or participating in an interesting and
stimulating activity. The named plaintiff also benefits, along with other class
members, from the recovery that the litigation generates. However, unlike
the psychic benefit, which the named plaintiff monopolizes, the benefit from
the recovery is shared with other class members.
For class actions to be effectively litigated, it is necessary that at least
one plaintiff be willing to take on the role of class representative, and that,
having assumed that responsibility, he or she carry it out effectively. The costs
and benefits of class representation outlined above are not, in themselves,
optimally designed to achieve these goals. In some cases-consumer class
actions, where the typical class-member recovery is low, being an example-a
class member may even experience a net loss from acting as class champion
because the small recoveries normally gained from the case are not enough to
6. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
7. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
8. See In re Cont'l I11. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cit. 1992).
1305
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cover the increased costs of serving as the named plaintiff. In other cases, the
class member's expected benefits may exceed her costs of acting as class rep-
resentative, but free-rider effects make her unwilling to go forward. In this
situation, the class member may be better off staying on the sidelines in hopes
that someone else will incur the costs of representing the class. At the limit,
free-rider effects can result in litigation failing because no one is willing to act
as class champion. But even if a class member does come forward, the costs
and benefits outlined above do not create incentives for efficient
representative participation because the named plaintiff gains only a fraction
of the value added by his or her efforts on behalf of the class.
The foregoing discussion suggests the potential social value of compen-
sating named plaintiffs for the full costs of their contributions to the litigation,
and also rewarding them for good performance. But who should decide
whether and how much the class representative should be paid? Class counsel
might seem best situated for this role. Attorneys for the class pay the
expenses of litigation in other respects.9 Moreover, they are familiar with the
case and, because of the attorney-client privilege, are the only parties who
have a full opportunity to observe how the named plaintiff performs his or her
responsibilities to the class. They also have a strong interest in the success of
the litigation, and therefore are well suited, at least in some respects, to deter-
mine whether and to what extent the named plaintiff deserves and receives
compensation for his or her services. In fact, class attorneys typically do pro-
vide some compensation to the named plaintiff, as out-of-pocket costs may
generally be reimbursed by class counsel as expenses of litigation.l
But the representative plaintiff's nonpecuniary costs-the opportunity
costs of time, the anxiety or stress incident to the case, or the risk of retalia-
tion or harm to reputation-are not readily classifiable as "expenses." An
9. Class counsel often pay, for example, expert witness fees and expenses.
10. As parties, representative plaintiffs may not be compensated for costs normally paid to
witnesses, such as the expenses of travel to and from a deposition. See Heverly v. Lewis, 99 F.R.D.
135, 136 (D. Nev. 1983). However, ethics rules applicable in most states permit the class
attorneys to pay the expenses of litigation with repayment to come, if at all, from the amount of
any judgment or settlement. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(1) (2002)
(providing that a lawyer "may advance court costs and expenses of litigation" on behalf of the
client). The out-of-pocket costs of the representative plaintiff in participating in the litigation-for
example, transportation to the courthouse or meals during a deposition--can reasonably be
included in the category of "expenses" of the litigation. Even in states where the lawyer's
advances are subject to the caveat that the client must be "ultimately liable" for expenses, class
counsel are typically not disabled from paying the client's out-of-pocket costs. See Geoffrey P.
Miller, Payment of Expenses in Securities Class Actions: Ethical Dilemmas, Class Counsel, and
Congressional Intent, 22 REV. LITIG. 557 (2003) (discussing legal strategies for advancing expenses
to the client in such jurisdictions on a contingent basis).
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attorney who paid for these items could be accused of paying the party to act
as the named plaintiff, and such payments could provide a basis for the defen-
dant to object to the named plaintiffs typicality or adequacy, or the adequacy
of class counsel. They could also subject the attorney to sanction under ethics
rules for providing impermissible financial assistance to a client."
Even if it were possible to fully compensate the named plaintiff for both
pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs, moreover, such payments would not provide
the named plaintiff with incentives to act as the best possible agent for the
class. Because these payments would only be compensatory, the represen-
tative plaintiff would receive no reward for doing a good job and incur no penalty
for doing a bad one. Moreover, performance-based payments by attorneys might
not be in the interest of the class. The named plaintiff's expectation of
compensation from the attorney could potentially interfere with rather than
motivate adequate representation because the plaintiff may respond to the
interests of the attorney instead of those of the class when the two conflict.
In the absence of an effective mechanism for compensating class repre-
sentatives through class counsel (other than reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses), the interests of the class and the purposes of class action litigation
can be served by allowing the court the discretion to pay class representatives.
The court is not limited by the ethical constraints on supporting litigation
that may hamper counsel. Judges are not subject to the self-interest that may
impair counsel's judgment. And the court has access to a convenient pool of
funds-the amount of any judgment or settlement for the class. Perhaps for
these reasons, courts do, in fact, frequently make incentive awards to named
plaintiffs at the conclusion of class action litigation.
This Article enhances our knowledge about such awards. Our dataset is a
sample of 374 opinions in class action settlements published from 1993 to
2002. We examine this dataset in light of four possible functions of incentive
awards: (1) reimbursing some or all of the representative plaintiffs nonpecuniary
costs; (2) rewarding the representative plaintiff for superior service; (3) com-
pensating the representative plaintiff for complying with the attorney's
wishes, even at the expense of the class; and (4) achieving proportionality
between the incentive award and other outcomes in the case.
In brief, our findings are as follows. Incentive awards were granted in
about 28 percent of the sample. The rate of awards varied by case category, with
consumer credit class actions yielding awards in 59 percent of the cases,
employment discrimination actions 46 percent, and antitrust class actions
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (generally prohibiting a lawyer from
providing "financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation").
Class Action Incentive Awards 1307
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resulting in awards in about one-third of the cases. Corporate derivative and
mass tort class actions had incentive awards in less than 10 percent of the cases.
Securities cases, in settlements believed to occur before the effective date of the
PSLRA (which limited incentive awards 2), granted incentive awards in about
24 percent of the cases.
When given, incentive awards constituted a small fraction of total class
recovery. In the ninety cases in which sufficient data were reported, the total
incentive award to all representative plaintiffs constituted, on average, 0.16
percent of the class recovery. The median total incentive award constituted,
on average, 0.02 percent of the class recovery. Across all case categories, when
an incentive award was granted, the average total award was $128,803 and
the median total award was $18,190. Awards were typically split among
several representative plaintiffs. The average award per class representative
was $15,992 and the median award per class representative was $4357. The
size of total incentive awards varied by the subject matter of class actions,
with employment discrimination cases being statistically significantly associ-
ated with large percentage incentive awards. The size of total incentive
awards was strongly associated with the size of the class recovery, the recovery
per class member, the amount of attorneys' fees awarded, and the award of
costs and expenses.
We find support for the hypothesis that some incentive awards are
designed to reimburse some or all of the representative plaintiffs nonpecuniary
costs. For example, we interpret the high rate of incentive awards in
consumer credit cases as reflecting courts' wish to ensure that class represen-
tatives with small damages do not incur a net loss from the litigation due to their
service to the class. The substantial incentive awards observed in employ-
ment discrimination cases can be interpreted as reflecting the courts' wish to
make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs
of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on
the job. We also find a significant, positive relation between the presence of
incentive awards and the ratio of counsels' costs and expenses to the median
recovery per class member. If counsels' costs and expenses are a reasonable proxy
for the representative plaintiffs costs, then this relation is further evidence
supporting the reimbursement hypothesis. We find no significant relation
between the presence of incentive awards and another possible proxy for the
representative plaintiffs costs-the time elapsed between filing and settlement.
We also find support for the hypothesis that incentive awards are cali-
brated to other aspects of the case. We find a strong positive relation between
12. See statutes cited infra note 22.
1308 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1303 (2006)
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class recovery and aggregate incentive awards. Because, as shown in our prior
work, a strong association exists between class recovery and both attorneys'
fees and the expenses of the litigation, incentive awards also display a
significant correlation with both the attorneys' fees and the expenses awarded
in the settlement.13 Further, as is also shown in our prior work, the award of
attorneys' fees and expenses displays a scaling effect, with awards decreasing
as a percentage of the recovery as the recovery increases.14 We find a similar
scaling effect with respect to incentive awards.
We find mixed support for the hypothesis that incentive awards serve as a
means for rewarding class representatives for superior service to the class.
Incentive awards are not higher or more frequent in cases where the attorneys' fees
award is low, suggesting that courts are not compensating the representative
plaintiff for monitoring counsel to keep fees under control. We find a
positive, significant relation between the size of incentive awards and the
presence of settlement objectors. Higher incentive awards in such cases
would be in tension with the reward-for-service hypothesis if objectors appear
when settlements are not advantageous to the class (which is admittedly a
contestable proposition). On the other hand, we find a consistent, significant
association between high-risk litigation and the size of incentive awards, a
finding that tends to support the reward-for-service hypothesis, because settle-
ment of a high-risk case is some indication that the class representative has
provided good service. 5
We find contradictory evidence that incentive awards for class represen-
tatives reflect the attorneys' self-interest. No strong association exists
between the presence of incentive awards and the size of the attorneys' fees.
If attorneys were acting in their self-interest when they recommend awards to
the court, we might expect to see the rate of awards increase with increased
fees. We might also expect that self-interested attorneys would be disinclined
to recommend incentive awards in large-scale, small-claim consumer cases
because, given the very large number of potential clients, an attorney can
easily find alternative class representatives and thus is not subject to hold-out
threats from the named plaintiff. However, controlling for class recoveries,
incentive awards did not vary significantly with class size. On the other
hand, the evidence of significantly larger incentive awards for employment
discrimination plaintiffs provides some evidence for the attorney self-interest
13. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An
Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004).
14. Id.
15. For a discussion of high-risk coding, see id. at 38 n.20, 45, 65.
1309
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hypothesis. The representative plaintiff in a "pattern or practice" employ-
ment case has significant bargaining leverage with class counsel, both because
the damages are typically large enough to support an individual lawsuit and
because the named plaintiff is often a key witness and an important liaison
with absent plaintiffs. The hope for a generous incentive award at the end of the
case could tend to counteract the representative plaintiff's hold-out threat and
thus could serve the interests of class counsel even at the expense of the class.
Overall, the evidence suggests that incentive awards serve multiple
goals. They compensate representative plaintiffs for costs and appear to
reflect the court's assessment of reasonable proportionality between the
incentive award and other case outcomes. They may also, to some extent,
compensate class representatives for what the court perceives to be superior
service to the class, and may sometimes serve the interests of the class attorneys,
though it would be hard to isolate that as their sole function. On balance, we
find little evidence of systematic abuse of incentive awards. On the other
hand, there are theoretical reasons for granting such awards in appropriate
cases. Inability to grant incentive awards may deter participation as class
representatives. This problem becomes acute when the representative
plaintiff is an institutional investor that must take its fiduciary obligations to
its investors into account. 6 Given the modest frequency and size of incentive
awards, and their possible benefits, courts that flatly refuse to grant them in
any cases (rather than supervise their scope in particular cases), and laws that
forbid them, may generate inefficiencies in class action litigation.
Part I of this Article reviews past incentive-award practices and prior
studies of incentive awards. Part II formulates testable hypotheses about the
rate and level of incentive awards. Part III describes the data, and Part IV
reports the results.
I. INCENTIVE-AWARD PRACTICES AND STUDIES
Courts once tended to limit incentive awards to cases where the repre-
sentative plaintiff had provided special services to the class-for example,
providing financial or logistical support to the litigation or acting as an expert
consultant. 7 Beginning around 1990, however, awards for representative
16. The problem here is analogous to the difficulty institutional investors face when acting
as representative plaintiffs in jurisdictions that require, as a matter of legal ethics, that the client
assume ultimate responsibility for litigation expenses. See Miller, supra note 10.
17. See Irwin H. Warren & Darla C. Stuckey, Recent Developments in Class Actions:
Attorneys' Fees, Partial Settlements and Awards to Named Plaintiffs, in 1 PRACTISING LAW INST.,
CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 625,664 (1992).
1310 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1303 (2006)
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plaintiffs began to find readier acceptance."8 Cases approving incentive
awards proliferated" and tests developed to identify the appropriate condi-
tions for the grant of an award." By the turn of the century, some considered
these awards to be "routine."'"
Even as incentive awards were achieving recognition, however, the
pendulum had begun to swing against them. The PSLRA, enacted in 1995,
prohibits incentive awards to representative plaintiffs in securities class
actions.22 Congress's most recent foray into the regulation of class action
18. See, e.g., In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig. 130 F.R.D. 366, 373-74
(S.D. Ohio 1990) (citing four 19 80s incentive-award cases). Because our data commence in 1993,
we cannot test a hypothesis about an increase around 1990. We do, however, find some evidence
of growth in the rate of incentive awards from the earliest years in our data. In the two years
before 1995, incentive awards were reported in 20.3 percent of cases. From 1995 through 2002,
incentive awards were reported in 29.8 percent of cases, an increase of almost 50 percent. The
difference is statistically significant at p = 0.12. We find no evidence that the amount of
incentive awards increased over time, a finding similar to the absence of increase in class
recoveries and attorneys' fee awards reported in Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 13.
19. See, e.g., In re U.S. Bancorp Litig., 291 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir. 2002) (approving
$2000 incentive awards to five named plaintiffs out of a class potentially numbering more than
four million in a settlement of $3.5 million); In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 463
(9th Cit. 2000) (approving incentive awards of $5000 to each of the two class representatives of
5400 potential class members in a settlement of $1.725 million); In re Cont'l I11. Sec. Litig., 962
F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cit. 1992) (considering incentive fees to compensate named plaintiffs for the
risks they take and their vanguard role in the class action); In re SmithKline Beckman Corp. Sec.
Litig., 751 F. Supp. 525, 535 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (approving $5000 awards for one named
representative of each of nine plaintiff classes involving more than 22,000 claimants in a
settlement of $22 million).
20. These courts focused on factors such as the effort required by the particular plaintiff,
Huguley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 128 F.R.D. 81, 85 (E.D. Mich. 1989), aff'd, 925 F.2d 1464 (6th
Cir. 1991), the burdens imposed by discovery, Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 621 F. Supp. 27, 32
(E.D. Pa. 1985), a reward for being the first to complain of a questionable practice, In re Dun &
Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig., 130 F.R.D. 366, 374 (S.D. Ohio 1990), disruption caused
by litigation, Golden v. Shulman, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
9194,060, at 90,954 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), and representing the class when an individual claim might
have been more easily resolved, Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68, 90 (D.D.C. 1981).
21. Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 694 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("Courts routinely
approve incentive awards to compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provided and the
risks they incurred during the course of the class action litigation.") (quoting In re S. Ohio Corr.
Facility, 175 F.R.D. 270, 272 (S.D. Ohio 1997)).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2000) requires a representative plaintiff in securities
litigation to file a sworn certification with the complaint that "states that the plaintiff will not
accept any payment for serving as a representative party on behalf of a class beyond the plaintiffs
pro rata share of any recovery, except as ordered or approved by the court in accordance with
paragraph (4)."
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4) states:
The share of any final judgment or of any settlement that is awarded to a
representative party serving on behalf of a class shall be equal, on a per share basis, to the
portion of the final judgment or settlement awarded to all other members of the class.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the award of reasonable costs and
HeinOnline -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1311 2005-2006
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litigation, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 23 also reflects mis-
givings about incentive awards. The congressional findings prefacing that
statute characterize as one of the "abuses" of class action practice the situation
in which "unjustified awards are made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of other
class members."24 Although the only operational provision of CAFA relevant to
incentive awards pertains to extra compensation based on geographic loca-
tion,25 the spirit of this legislation is unfriendly to routine incentive payments.
Mirroring these shifting patterns in the legal treatment of incentive
awards has been a vibrant normative debate. Some courts and commentators
have criticized incentive awards on the ground that they undermine the
named plaintiffs incentives to monitor suboptimal or collusive settlements.26
Incentive awards have also been seen as providing inappropriate leverage to
plaintiffs to threaten class action litigation in order to obtain a larger settle-
ment in their individual lawsuits.27 Others have expressed concern about the
fairness of the named plaintiff receiving a larger award than the rest of the
class.28 Incentive awards have been stigmatized as a means for paying off
expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the representation of the class to any
representative party serving on behalf of a class.
The PSLRA applies to actions filed after December 22, 1995. Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 108, 109 Stat. 737, 758.
23. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
24. Id. § 2(a)(3)(B), 119 Stat. at 4.
25. See id. § 3(a), 119 Stat. at 7 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1714) ("The court may not
approve a proposed settlement that provides for the payment of greater sums to some class
members than to others solely on the basis that the class members to whom the greater sums are to
be paid are located in closer geographic proximity to the court.").
26. See, e.g., Weseley v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 711 F. Supp. 713, 720-21 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (observing that "if class representatives expect routinely to receive special awards in addition
to their share of the recovery, they may be tempted to accept suboptimal settlements at the
expense of the class members whose interests they are appointed to guard"); Women's Comm. for
Equal Employment Opportunity v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 76 F.R.D. 173, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Brown
v. Steinberg, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9[ 95,680, at 98166 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); James N. Benedict & Martin L. Seidel, Special Compensation for Named Plaintiffs in
Securities Class Actions, 24 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 195 (1991).
27. See Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1978) (noting that the court
should "insure that, under the guise of compromising the plaintiffs individual claim, the parties have
not compromised the class claim to the pecuniary advantage of the plaintiff and/or his attorney's").
28. See, e.g., Plummer v. Chem. Bank, 91 F.R.D. 434, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[A]dditional
benefits to the named plaintiffs ... must be regarded as prima facie evidence that the settlement is
unfair to the class."). In one leading case, Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 975-78 (9th Cir.
2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a consent decree in an employment
discrimination case, in part, on the ground that certain plaintiffs-who were individual clients of
class counsel-received much more in the settlement than other plaintiffs. Although the court
did award small incentive bonuses to the representative plaintiffs, the tenor and reasoning of the
opinion appears hostile to any such awards that are significantly disproportionate to the amounts
received by the plaintiff class as a whole. Id. (expressing concern that disproportionate awards
HeinOnline -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1312 2005-2006
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"professional plaintiffs."29 Some have noted the lack of specific authorization
for incentive awards in the relevant statutes or court rules."
Other observers have offered arguments in favor of incentive awards.
Such awards are seen as necessary in order to provide adequate incentives to
representative plaintiffs to step forward as champions for the class.3' In the
absence of appropriate incentives, the public policy objectives of the class action
procedure may not be achieved. From a doctrinal perspective, incentive awards
have been justified as a form of restitution for a benefit conferred on others. 2
To date, this normative debate has not been significantly grounded in
data. In fact, little systematic information exists about the frequency and
amount of incentive awards. Willging et al. studied all class actions termi-
nated in four districts between July 1, 1992 and June 30, 1994. 33 In the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, the Southern District of Florida, the Northern
District of Illinois, and the Northern District of California, the authors found
that incentive awards were granted in 26, 46, 40, and 37 percent of the cases,
respectively.34 The median amounts of all awards to class representatives
ranged from $7500 in two districts to $17,000 in the Northern District of
California.35 The median award per representative in three courts was under
may result in the "considerable danger of individuals bringing cases as class actions principally to
increase their own leverage to attain a remunerative settlement for themselves and then trading
on that leverage in the course of negotiations").
29. This was a major theme in the legislative history of the PSLRA. The Conference
Report for that statute explained the rationale for prohibiting incentive awards as follows:
Professional plaintiffs who own a nominal number of shares in a wide array of public
companies permit lawyers readily to file abusive securities class action lawsuits .... These
lead plaintiffs often receive compensation in the form of bounty payments or bonuses.
... Lead plaintiffs are not entitled to a bounty for their services. Individuals who
are motivated by the payment of a bounty or bonus should not be permitted to serve as
lead plaintiffs. These individuals do not adequately represent other shareholders-in
many cases the "lead plaintiff' has not even read the complaint.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32-33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731-32.
30. See Sofia C. Hubscher, Making It Worth Plaintiffs' While: Extra Incentive Awards to Named
Plaintiffs in Class Action Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463,
482 (1992).
31. See, e.g., id.; Clinton A. Krislov, Scrutiny of the Bounty: Incentive Awards for Plaintiffs in
Class Litigation, 78 ILL. B.J. 286, 290 (1990); Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y., Financial Arrangements in Class Actions, and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831 (1993).
32. See In re Cont'l I11. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cit. 1992).
33. Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23
to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 101 (1996) (based on THOMAS E.
WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER, & ROBERT J. NIEMIc, FED JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1996) [hereinafter FJC REPORT]).
34. Id.
35. Id.
HeinOnline -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1313 2005-2006
$3000 and was $7560 in the Northern District of California. The median
percentage of the settlement amount that was awarded to class representa-
tives was not more than 0.011 percent in any of the four districts.36  In
another study, Downs analyzed class action lawsuits that had been filed and
resolved in the Northern District of California from 1985 through 1993. He
found that, of twenty-four settled class actions, "[pireferences to the named
representatives occurred in four cases (16 percent), and inequality in the plan
of distribution appeared on the record in five lawsuits (20.8 percent)."'
Lastly, Hensler et al. report incentive awards of $2500, $3000, and $10,000,
to various named plaintiffs in three of ten class actions that the RAND
Institute for Civil Justice studied in detail)8 The payments to representative
plaintiffs in one case with figures available appear to have comprised 0.018
percent of the minimum payout amount,'9 and in the other case appear to
have comprised 0.005 percent of the payout.' These studies, although helpful,
were based on limited data, focused on only a few jurisdictions, or, in the case
of Hensler et al., were limited to ten cases.
II. HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE PATTERN OF INCENTIVE AWARDS
Our study investigates four hypotheses about the pattern of incentive
awards. First, incentive awards may reimburse representative plaintiffs for
some or all of the costs of their service to the class. Second, incentive awards
may be used to reward representative plaintiffs for superior service to the class.
Third, incentive awards may be used to further the attorney's self-interest.
Fourth, incentive awards may be set so as to be proportional to other
outcomes of the case. The following discussion explains the rationale under-
lying these four hypotheses.
36. Id.
37. Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case
for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 710 (1994); see also Krislov, supra note 31; Jerold S. Solovy,
Laura A. Kaster & Jeanine M. Jiganti, The Head of the Class, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 13;
supra text accompanying note 31.
38. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 219, 359, 361, 388 (2000).
39. In In re Louisiana-Pacific Inner-Seal Litig., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Or. 2002), as cited
by HENSLER ET AL., supra note 38, at 339, nine plaintiffs or couples initially received $3000 each,
and one condominium association received $10,000. Id. at 359. Four additional intervenors
received $3000 after an appeal. Id. at 361. The payments to representative plaintiffs thus totaled
$49,000. The defendant's minimal funding obligation was $275 million. Id. at 358.
40. In Cox v. Shell Oil Co., No. Civ. A18,844, 1995 WL 775363 (Tenn. Ch. Nov. 17,
1995), as cited by HENSLER ET AL., supra note 38, at 375, sixteen representative plaintiffs received
$3000 each., for a total of $48,000. Id. at 388. The settlement fund had a "soft cap" of $950
million. Id. at 387-88.
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A. Cost Reimbursement
A minimum condition for an economically rational class member to
step forward as class representative is that his benefits must exceed his costs.
If R is the expected recovery from the litigation for a class member and C is his
expected cost from serving as a class representative (where C is defined
generously to include out-of-pocket costs, opportunity costs, loss of reputa-
tion, and subjective litigation costs or benefits), the relation between R and
C should influence his willingness to act on behalf of the class. A rational
class member would not agree to be the representative plaintiff where R is less
than C. The cost-reimbursement hypothesis would predict incentive awards
in such cases, with the size of the award increasing with the difference
between R and C. The hypothesis therefore suggests that awards will be more
common and larger: (1) holding constant C, in cases with low R; and (2) holding
constant R, in cases with high C.
Even when R exceeds C, an incentive award may still be warranted
under the cost-reimbursement hypothesis. Because representative class
members incur all the nonpecuniary costs of representing the class but gain
only a fractional share of the class recovery, they will receive less than other
class members at the end of the day if no incentive award is given-a result
that seems particularly unfair given that, by coming forward, they have con-
ferred a benefit on the class. Further, knowing this fact, a rational class
member may elect to sit on the sidelines and hope that some other class
member will come forward because he can thereby avoid the nonpecuniary
costs of acting as class representative. These fairness and free-rider concerns
suggest that incentive awards may be granted, under the cost-reimbursement
hypothesis, when C is substantial, even if R is also large. The size of the class
may also be relevant in this regard. When the class grows very large, it
becomes likely that some class member will come forward despite free-rider
effects. So the cost-reimbursement hypothesis also predicts that awards will
be more common and larger: (3) in cases where C is large, regardless of R;
and (4) in smaller as opposed to larger classes.
In some types of cases, the nature of the litigation itself provides evi-
dence that C will be high. In "pattern or practice" employment discrimina-
tion cases, for example, representative plaintiffs will often be key witnesses
and may also act as liaisons between the attorneys and members of the class.
These additional responsibilities increase costs for representative plaintiffs.
At the same time, representative plaintiffs in such cases may suffer retaliation
1315
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on the job4 or loss of employment prospects4 -- consequences that may also
significantly increase their costs. Accordingly, the cost-reimbursement
hypothesis suggests that incentive awards will be more frequent and larger in
employment cases than in other types of class actions.
In the more typical case, we cannot infer from the nature of the action
whether the representative plaintiffs costs will be low or high. Here, our data
about costs is necessarily indirect. The amount of costs and expenses claimed
by counsel is one potential proxy for costs borne by representative plaintiffs.
The cost-reimbursement hypothesis thus predicts that the existence and
amount of incentive awards will be a positive function of class counsel's
expenses, holding other factors constant. Another proxy for the representative
plaintiffs costs is the age of the case: The older the case, the more time and
effort the representative plaintiff will have presumably expended in
monitoring it. Thus the cost-reimbursement hypothesis suggests that the
grant and level of incentive awards will also be a positive function of the age
of the case, holding other factors constant.
B. Reward for Performance
A second hypothesis is that incentive awards are used to reward repre-
sentative plaintiffs for superior service to the class. Representative plaintiffs
may be compensated based on the quality of their performance.
Representative plaintiffs can serve a class in several ways. First, repre-
sentative plaintiffs might serve the class by exerting downward pressure on
attorneys' fees and generating a greater net recovery for the class. If incentive
awards are being used in this fashion, we would expect that incentive awards
will be more common and larger when attorneys' fees are lower, holding constant
the size of the class recovery.
Second, representative plaintiffs might be rewarded for their performance
in taking on risky litigation because, if such litigation generates a settlement,
it may be inferred that the representative plaintiff has provided superior
service to the class. We therefore might find a positive association between a
high-risk case and the grant of an incentive award.
41. See, e.g., Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 185, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (authorizing
incentive awards ranging up to $85,000 and noting that "the litigant who remains on the job can
expect ... that lower level co-workers and supervisors may perceive his or her actions as disloyalty
and evidence of an attitude contrary to the common good").
42. See, e.g., Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 694 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (awarding
$300,000 incentive payments to each of four representative plaintiffs in lieu of compensation
plaintiffs would have received as members of the class, and observing that these individuals had
agreed never to seek reemployment with the defendant).
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Third, service to the class, for both class representatives and attorneys,
might be evaluated by the class's reaction to the settlement. The premise here is
that class members will opt out or object if the deal struck by the attorneys and
class representatives is insufficiently favorable.43 On this view, incentive awards
should be less frequent, and lower, in the presence of objection to a settlement.
One obvious measure of performance, the size of the class recovery, is
initially an attractive candidate for measuring performance, and incentive
awards are strongly correlated with the size of the class recovery. However, the
class recovery is not a good proxy for the quality of service provided by class
representatives because it does not measure what the class would have received
if the class representative had done a worse (or better) job. Therefore, we do
not view the correlation as reflecting a reward for performance. However, as
discussed below, an alternative hypothesis may explain the correlation.
C. Attorney Self-Interest
Incentive awards may be used to further the attorneys' self-interest by
rewarding malleable representative plaintiffs. Because it is attorneys who
typically suggest the propriety and amount of an incentive award to the court,
attorneys have the ability to manipulate the process to serve their own objectives.
The attorney self-interest hypothesis generates several predictions. First, one
might expect to find an association between the presence of an incentive
award and the attorneys' fees. If attorneys reward representative plaintiffs for
serving the attorneys' interests at the expense of the class, we would expect
that, holding other factors constant, incentive awards will be more frequent
and higher as fees increase.
Second, if objectors appear more frequently in settlements that enrich
the attorney at the expense of the class, this hypothesis would predict more
frequent and higher awards when objectors are present. On the other hand,
this factor must be assessed with caution as probative of the attorney self-
interest hypothesis because the presence of objection may be independently
correlated with increased costs for representative plaintiffs, so higher awards
in cases with objectors may sometimes be warranted even without considering
attorney self- interest.
Third, the attorney self-interest hypothesis predicts that incentive awards
will be more frequent and larger in cases where the class member has significant
43. This premise is contestable given the very low levels of dissent observed in most class
action settlements. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors
in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529 (2004).
Class Action Incentive Awards 1317
HeinOnline -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1317 2005-2006
53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1303 (2006)
bargaining leverage vis- -vis the attorney. This would suggest a negative
correlation between incentive awards and the size of the class (where the class
is small, the attorney may have difficulty finding plaintiffs, and accordingly
would rely on the representative plaintiff not to drop out). It would also
suggest that incentive awards will be more common and larger when the
attorney relies on the class representative's active participation in the
litigation-as, for example, when the class member is influential with other,
absent class members, or when the class claims are tried with evidence supplied
by the representative plaintiff. A classic example of this situation is, again, the
"pattern or practice" employment discrimination action, where, because of the
substantial individual damages and the named plaintiffs role in establishing
proof of class-wide discrimination and in organizing the class members on the job,
the attorney has an interest in securing that individual's support with the
prospect of a substantial incentive award at the point of settlement.
Fourth, the attorney self-interest hypothesis might predict that incentive
awards will be larger in state court than in federal court. For example, CAFA
appears to have been premised on the assumption that federal courts are better
than state courts at policing against "professional plaintiffs" who are little
more than paid agents of class counsel.' If these premises are accurate, 45 one
might expect that incentive awards will be less frequent and smaller in federal
court than in state court.
44. See supra text accompanying note 25. This perception was part of a broader belief, on
the part of some in Congress, that state courts are more favorably inclined toward class actions
generally. See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS' CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 3 (2005),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ClActO5.pdf/$file/CIActO5.pdf (referring to 2003
House version of CAFA, which stated that state courts give less scrutiny to the merits of class
action lawsuits); John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal Case Out of
It... in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143 (2001).
45. The best information currently available does not support substantial differences
between state and federal courts in the processing of class actions. WILLGING & WHEATMAN,
supra note 44, at 42 (finding little evidence of federal-state differences in treatment of class
actions); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 13 (finding that attorneys' fees in settled class actions
were not greater as a percentage of the recovery in state as opposed to federal court). But cf.
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1507 (1995) (noting that forum mattered in study of non-class action cases). CAFA's reliance
on removal from federal to state court as a procedural mechanism is questionable in light of
evidence of increasing abuse of the removal process. Theodore Eisenberg & Trevor W. Morrison,
Overlooked in the Tort Reform Debate: The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 551 (2005).
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D. Proportionality
Courts may grant incentive awards with a view toward achieving a
degree of proportionality with other key case outcomes. This theory suggests
that the amount of the incentive award should be positively associated with
the recovery per class member and the class recovery as a whole. The theory
might also suggest a positive association between the incentive award and the
size of the attorneys' fees or the amount awarded to the attorney for costs and
expenses. Previous research reports evidence that the principal cost of
bringing an action, the professional services of an attorney, decreases as class
size increases, due to economies of scale in class litigation.46 Scale effects are
also observed for the award of counsels' costs and expenses.47 A principle of
proportionality would suggest a similar scale effect for incentive awards, with
such awards constituting a decreasing fraction of the class recovery as the
recovery grows larger.
III. DATA DESCRIPTION
To explore incentive awards, we used data previously compiled on all
state and federal class actions with reported fee decisions between 1993 and
2002, inclusive, in which the fee and class recovery could be determined with
reasonable confidence.48 The list of cases analyzed started with this previously
gathered database. We searched in the Westlaw "ALLCASES" database using
the search "settlement & 'class action' & attorney! w/2 fee! & da(aft 1992 &
bef 2003)." This search's results were checked against a search of the Lexis
"Mega" database using the same search terms. We also compiled lists of
citations in the cases found by these search requests and included any
additional cases meeting the basic search criteria. We further checked the
list against the CCH Federal Securities and Trade Regulation Reporters.
For this Article we supplemented our recovery and fees database with
information from a new search that focused more specifically on incentive
awards. This new search also used the "ALLCASES" database and consisted
of "settlement & 'class action' & incentive w/2 award & da(aft 1992 & bef
2003)." The search yielded three additional relevant opinions, two of which
authorized incentive awards and one of which denied an incentive award.
One of the new opinions was an additional opinion filed in a case previously
46. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 13, at 64.
47. Id. at 70-72.
48. Id. at 28.
1319
HeinOnline -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1319 2005-2006
53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1303 (2006)
included in our database. Once cases had been identified by these methods,
we sometimes gathered additional information about case characteristics from
other sources-for example, information on the Internet or docket entries in
the U.S. Courts' Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system.
These searches yielded an initial list of 452 cases.
For cases filed after December 22, 1995, the PSLRA prohibits incentive
awards in private securities cases.49 Many opinions do not contain precise filing-
date information, so we cannot prune the securities subset of cases to include
only those eligible for incentive awards. To remove most post-PSLRA cases
ineligible for incentive awards, we omitted securities cases terminated after
1997. Inspection of the rate of incentive awards before and after that date
yielded a noticeable drop in the rate of incentive awards for securities cases
reported after 1997. Deletion of the post-PSLRA cases and a few cases with
missing data yielded 374 cases suitable for analysis of incentive awards.
Two key variables of interest are whether an incentive award was given
and the size of the incentive award. Of the 374 cases, 104 (27.8 percent)
reported incentive awards. Ninety-four of the 104 cases with an award
reported the maximum amount of the incentive award. In cases with
incentive awards for more than one class representative, we coded the incen-
tive award that was the highest of any individual incentive award in a case,
the sum of all incentive awards in a case, and the average incentive award in
a case. Ninety of the 104 cases with an incentive award reported sufficient
information to compute the sum of the incentive awards, and eighty-seven
cases reported sufficient information to compute the average incentive award.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables available at the indi-
vidual case level. Additional information about some of the variables used is
available in a prior study.5° A breakdown by case categories appears in tables
later in this Article as appropriate for the question being discussed.
49. See statutes cited supra note 22.
50. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 13.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
Used to Analyze Incentive Awards
Mean Median Std. Dev. N
98,200.56 11,208.72 406,783.39 304
7.00 7.05 0.99 304
17,626.52 5311.37 43,226.82 94
3.74 3.73 0.62 94
128,803.93 18,190.72 689,958.24 90
4.20 4.26 0.77 90
15,991.54 4357.44 42,448.96 87
3.70 3.64 0.63 87
8,870,101 1,709,997 31,400,000 346
6.22 6.23 0.82 346
1,061,172 186,089.6 3,114,844 252
5.19 5.27 0.95 252
Variable
A. Continuous Variables
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Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
For some purposes, we needed to know not only the fact or size of the
incentive award but also the size of the class and the recovery per class member.
For example, the recovery per class member can be crucial in assessing the
economics of class action litigation for representative plaintiffs. In other published
work, we reported, by case category, the recovery per class member and the mean
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and median number of class members in a database consisting of cases that reported
opt-out and dissenting behavior.5 These numbers, used here, are summarized in
the Appendix. We make use of those numbers here but note that they are
estimates not derived from actual class sizes in all of the cases analyzed here.
As in our prior class action research, a qualification about using published
opinions is in order. The dataset analyzed does not contain cases that did not
publish opinions. Although published opinions are not necessarily
representative of the universe of all cases, they can lead to important insights.
And opinions are in one important respect representative: For judges seeking
to inform their incentive-award decisions with knowledge of other cases,
published opinions are the prime source of data,52 and systematic analysis of
opinions should help inform decisionmaking. We discuss the implications of the
published-opinion filter for interpreting our findings after reporting the results.53
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Two features of incentive awards are worth separating. The first is the
decision whether to grant representative plaintiffs an incentive award. The
second is, given the existence of an award, what explains its amount. We first
report on the frequency of incentive awards and then the size of incentive
awards in those cases that grant awards.
A. The Frequency of Incentive Awards
Table 2 shows the rate at which incentive awards were given, broken down
by case categories. Across all case categories combined, incentive awards were
given in 27.8 percent of the 374 class actions. But substantial variation exists
across case categories. Consumer credit cases have the highest rate of incentive
awards (59 percent), followed by commercial cases (57 percent), insurance cases
(47 percent), employment discrimination cases (46 percent), and antitrust cases
(35 percent). Mass tort cases showed only one incentive award (7 percent).
One can reject the hypothesis of an equal rate of incentive awards across all
case categories at p = .0002."4 Previous work has suggested strong differences in
recovery and fee-award patterns between cases involving statutory fee-shifting
51. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43.
52. Cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1151, 1195 (1991).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 80-86.
54. Because of sparse cells in the table, a simple chi-squared calculation might yield unreliable
results. Fisher's exact test is too computationally intensive. The reported p-value is based on 1,000,000
Monte Carlo simulations using StatXact software version 6.2. A chi-squared test yields p = .0003.
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and other class actions.55 In results not reported here, we find no statistically
significant difference between rates of incentive awards in fee-shifting and non
fee-shifting cases.
Table 2. Number and Percent of Class Action Settlement Cases





















































































Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. Median class-member recoveries are from Eisenberg & Miller, supra note
43, at 1549. Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
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Table 2 demonstrates that incentive-award rates vary across case categories.
It is of interest to ascertain the reasons for these differences. Some information
on that question can be derived from examining the average recoveries per
class member in the different types of cases. We have elsewhere estimated the
recovery amount per class member in a variety of case types.56 Figure 1 shows
the relation, by case category, between the rate at which incentive awards were
given and the median class-member recovery.


















15 2 25 3 35 4
Median recovery per class member (log 10) $ 2002
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
A few findings emerge from an analysis of this figure and Table 2. First,
consumer credit cases display both the lowest median recoveries per class
member and the highest incidence of incentive awards. 7 This result is
56. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43, at 1548-50; see infra Appendix Table 1.
57. This category of consumer credit cases consists of several consumer credit case
categories that have statutory limitations on recoveries. It includes principally cases under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2) (2000), which account for
fifteen of the twenty-two cases in our consumer credit category. It also includes cases under the
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 2605(0(2) (2000), and the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, 12 U.S.C. § 4010(a)(2)
(2000). The low recoveries per class member are likely due to the presence of legislative caps on recovery
amounts. For example, the FDCPA caps damages at the lesser of $500,000 or 1 percent of the net
worth of the debt collector, and individual actions have damages capped at $1000. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(2). Our source of information about recoveries per class member and about class size,
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consistent with the cost-reimbursement hypothesis because, where per capita
recoveries are low, the typical class member will require an incentive award
to ensure that the costs of acting as class representative are not greater than
the recovery he or she can expect to receive from the litigation.
Second, employment discrimination cases differ from consumer credit
cases in their high median recoveries per class member, but also have high rates
of incentive awards. This finding is consistent with the cost-reimbursement
hypothesis. As Part II suggests, the costs to employment discrimination
representative plaintiffs of bringing an action are likely to be higher than for
plaintiffs in other case categories. Without incentive awards, those high costs
might make class action representation economically unattractive in
employment discrimination cases. Other kinds of employment law class
actions may lack the tangible and intangible costs of accusing one's employer of
discrimination. This may explain the lower rate of incentive awards in the
nondiscrimination employment category. The high frequency of incentive
awards in employment discrimination cases is also consistent with the attorney
self-interest hypothesis. Because plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases
may tend to have significant holdout power vis-A-vis class counsel, the
attorneys have an incentive to reward the representative plaintiff for compliant
behavior by providing them with incentive awards at time of settlement.
The relatively high rate of incentive awards in antitrust cases is likely due
to the presence in the antitrust category of several cases with recoveries per
class member of less than $100. We previously reported class-member recov-
eries based on nineteen antitrust cases.58 Review of those cases for purposes of
this study revealed that seven of the nineteen cases had recoveries of less than
$100 per class member. But the antitrust category also has several cases with
awards per class member of well over $1000. Antitrust cases' heterogeneity in
award levels distinguishes them from consumer credit cases, which have
uniformly low recoveries per class member. The antitrust category's incentive-
award rate of 35 percent may reflect its variance in the award distribution per
class member.
Table 2 shows that insurance cases have a high rate of incentive awards.
Insurance cases are reported in Table 2 but not in Figure 1. This is because the
dataset used in this Article to assess rates of incentive awards allows separation
infra Appendix Table 1, did not separately account for consumer credit cases other than FDCPA
cases. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43. In the analyses reported in this Article, we use the
recovery-per-class-member and class-size information for FDCPA cases for all twenty-two
consumer credit cases. We have rerun all key models reported in this Article and excluded the
consumer credit cases that are not FDCPA cases. No material differences in results emerged.
58. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43.
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of insurance cases. But our previous work, in which the per-class-member
recovery amounts are reported, and on which we rely here, did not segregate
insurance cases as a separate category. 9 It is probable that the high rate of
incentive awards in insurance cases results from the presence in the data of
low per capita recovery consumer class actions, where incentive awards may
be needed to prevent the representative plaintiff from incurring a loss for
representing the class.
Figure 1 and Table 2 show that commercial cases have high rates of
incentive awards. But, in our sample, commercial cases are a small and likely
heterogeneous case category, so we do not seek to explain its high incentive-
award rate. Indeed, the median class-member recovery amount in Figure 1 is
based on only two cases.6"
Table 3 explores the association between whether an incentive award
was given and the value of cases, both in the aggregate and on a per-class-
member basis. Table 2 and Figure 1 suggest the need to analyze the data with
and without the consumer credit cases to assess whether statistical findings
are an artifact of the distinctive pattern of consumer credit awards.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Table 3. Relation Between Recovery Amounts
and Grant of an Incentive Award
No incentive Incentive Significance
award given award given level (p-value)
Amount N Amount N
A. Total Class Recovery
Median gross recovery (log 10 $) 7.1 215 6.9 89 .065
Median gross recovery (log 10 $), 7.1 208 7.1 77 .630
excluding consumer credit cases
Median gross recovery ($ 000) 13,300 215 7283 89
Mean gross recovery (log 10 $) 7.1 215 6.8 89 .044
Mean gross recovery (log 10 $), 7.1 208 7.1 77 .788
excluding consumer credit cases
Mean gross recovery ($ 000) 116,000 215 54,200 89
B. Recovery Per Class Member
Median class-member recovery 2.7 2.6
(log 10 $)
Median class-member recovery ($) 1092 1616
Mean class-member recovery 3.2 3.1
(log 10 $)
Mean class-member recovery ($) 3537 3163
C. Attorneys' Costs and Expenses
Mean costs (log 10 $) 5.1 170 5.3 82 .282
Mean costs ($) 935,267 170 982,946 82
Mean costs (log 10 $)/median 1.9 161 2.1 77 .039
recovery per class member (log 10 $)
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. In Panel B and the last row of Panel C, each case was assigned the per-
class-member recovery amount for its case category based on Eisenberg & Miller, supra
note 43, at 1549. No case-level variation exists in the per-class-member data within
case categories, and no significance levels or frequencies are reported. See id. for the
number of cases used to compute the mean and median class-member recoveries.
Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
Table 3's first and fourth rows show hints of statistically significant asso-
ciations between a class's aggregate recovery and the existence of an incentive
award. But these associations are attributable to the influence of the consumer
credit cases. With consumer credit cases excluded from the analysis, Table 3's
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second and fifth rows show that the relation between incentive awards and
recovery size is not close to statistically significant.
Panel B of Table 3 reports on the association between grants of incentive
awards and recoveries per class member. Little difference in amounts
emerges. We do not report tests of the statistical significance of the difference
because the data come from two different sources. The recoveries per class
member are from previously published results. Each case in the instant
database was assigned the per-class-member recovery amount for its case
category. No case-level variation exists within case categories. Nevertheless,
the data suggest no striking pattern of differences in recoveries per class
member based on whether an incentive award was given.
Panel C explores the relation between the award for counsels' costs and
expenses and incentive awards. Attorneys' costs and expenses serve as a
proxy for representative-class-member costs, which we assume are borne dis-
proportionately by class representatives. Costs are modestly higher in cases
with incentive awards. The relation among costs and recovery per class
member is of prime interest. We define a "cost-recovery ratio" to be the ratio
of costs and expenses (log 10) to median class-member recovery (log 10).
Table 3's last row indicates a notable and statistically significant difference in
the cost-recovery ratio between cases with and without incentive awards.
Cases with incentive awards tend to have a higher ratio-they have higher
costs per class-member dollar of recovery. If attorneys' costs and expenses are
a reasonable proxy for costs bome disproportionately by representative plaintiffs,
then Panel C supports a cost-recovery-based description of courts' incentive-
award practices. As class representatives disproportionately suffer costs per
amount recovered, courts are more inclined to grant incentive awards.
Figure 2 is a box-and-whisker plot showing the ratio of costs to median
class-member recovery for cases with and without incentive awards. The plot
includes a box designating the 25th and 75th quartiles of the distribution of
the ratio. A horizontal line within the box indicates the median of the dis-
tribution. The "whiskers" extend to the farthest points that are within 1.5 times
the interquartile range. Each point more than 1.5 times the interquartile
range from the end of a box is indicated by a dot. The figure indicates that
cases without incentive awards have lower cost-recovery ratios than cases
with incentive awards.
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Figure 2. Ratio of Costs to Median Class-Member Recovery
No incentive award Incentive award
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. Costs are attorneys' costs and expenses. Median class-member recoveries
are from Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43, at 1549. Amounts are inflation-adjusted
2002 dollars.
Regression analysis confirms that increased costs are associated with
greater likelihood of the grant of an incentive award. Table 4 reports logistic
regression models in which the dependent variable is whether an incentive
award was given. The models include all cases with nonmissing data for the
relevant variables but are limited to those in which an incentive award was
approved.' In model (1), the ratio of costs to median class-member recovery
is the only explanatory variable. Model (2) adds a federal-case dummy variable
as an explanatory variable.62 The positive and statistically significant coefficient
on the ratio variable in both models indicates that an increasing cost ratio is
associated with an increase in the likelihood of an incentive award. Model
(3) uses costs and median class-member recovery as separate explanatory
variables rather than combining them into a single ratio. In choosing among
models, the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is a general model-fit index
61. For a model that includes both cases with and without incentive awards, see infra Table 10.
62. The variable equals one for federal cases and zero for state cases.
S
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used to compare the fit of statistical models.63 A lower AIC tends to indicate
that a model fits the data better than a higher AIC.6 The AIC for model (3)
is higher than in model (2), indicating that the ratio-based model fits the
data better than the model using separate variables for costs and class-
member recoveries. Model (4) uses the difference between costs and median
recovery rather than the ratio. It also has a higher AIC than model (2). The
ratio model, model (2), thus fits the data best. And the most important
feature of costs and median recoveries is their relation, not their values as
stand-alone variables.
Table 4. Logistic Regression Models of Whether
Courts Granted an Incentive Award
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable = incentive award granted
Ratio: costs to recovery 0.728** 0.751**
(3.75) (4.02)
Federal case 0.827+ 0.816+ 0.799+
(1.90) (1.80) (1.77)
Costs (log 10) 0.269+
(1.79)
Difference: costs minus recovery 0.316**
(3.28)
Median class-member recovery (log 10) -0.474
(1.35)
Constant -2.183** -2.963** -1.562 -2.224**
(4.66) (4.31) (1.01) (4.50)
Observations 238 238 238 238
Akaike Information Criteria 296.10 294.84 299.57 298.24
Robust z statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. The ratio of costs to recovery is the ratio of costs and expenses (log 10)
to median class-member recovery (log 10). The difference is these two quantities'
difference rather than ratio. Standard errors are computed based on clustering by case
category. Median class-member recoveries are from Eisenberg & Miller, supra note
43, at 1549. The clustering models fit the data better than models using dummy variables
for case categories. Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
63. JooP Hox, MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 45 (2002);
Hirotugu Akaike, Factor Analysis and AIC, 52 PSYCHOMETRIKA 317 (1987).
64. HOX, supra note 63, at 46.
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Models not reported here, using dummy variables for each case category,
did not fit the data as well as models (1), (2), and (4). In another model not
reported here, model (2)'s basic finding does not change if we exclude from
the sample consumer credit cases and employment discrimination cases.
Thus, these two relatively extreme categories are not driving the core relation
between the cost-recovery ratio and approval of incentive awards. Overall,
Table 4 supports the hypothesis that the decision to award incentive payments
is significantly influenced by costs to representative class members in relation
to the class members' expected recoveries.
Although the preceding analysis broadly confirms the cost-recovery
hypothesis, one result runs counter to the idea. The age of a case, a possible
measure of overall effort, was not associated with the grant of an award.
To the extent that denial of incentive awards is regarded as hostile to class
action activity, one might expect federal courts to be more reluctant to grant
incentive awards than state courts. Yet Table 4 indicates, if anything, the
opposite. Federal courts granted incentive awards in 91 of 287 cases, or 31.7
percent. State courts granted incentive awards in 13 of 87 cases, or 14.9
percent. The difference is statistically significant (p = .002 using Fisher's exact
test). Some of this difference may be attributable to the different case-
category mix that the two court systems receive. For example, none of the
high-incentive-award-rate consumer credit cases were state-court cases. In Table
4's regression models, marginally statistically significant differences persisted in
the rate at which federal and state courts granted incentive awards. This result
is in tension with the attorney self-interest hypothesis, which (weakly) predicts
that attorneys will have more power to influence courts to make awards to
representative plaintiffs in state courts than in federal court.
Other factors were not associated with the grant of an incentive award.
There was no stable, statistically significant relation between the award of
incentive fees and the overall size of class recovery, or the size of the class
attorneys' fee.65 Nor did we find an association between the mean or median
class-member recovery and the presence of an incentive award, or between the
risk of a case and the presence of an incentive award. Nor was there a significant
65. A Mann-Whitney test of whether the gross class recovery differs between incentive-
award cases and no-incentive-award cases yields p = .065. But this marginal statistical significance
fades if one excludes the consumer credit cases (p = .630). A Mann-Whitney test of whether
attorneys' fees differ between incentive-award cases and no-incentive-award cases yields p = .881.
If one excludes consumer credit cases, p = .087.
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association between class size and the grant of an incentive award,66 or between
the presence of objectors to the settlement and the grant of an incentive award.
In summary, granting an incentive award was common in those classes
of cases with very low recoveries, mostly consumer credit cases and antitrust
cases resembling consumer credit cases. Incentive awards were also common
in employment discrimination cases, where we believe the costs to represen-
tative plaintiffs are unusually high. The data support the cost-recovery theory
of incentive awards, but with the important caveat that it is the relation
between costs and class-member recovery, rather than costs alone, that best
fits the data. The greater frequency of incentive awards to representative
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases is also consistent with the attorney
self-interest hypothesis. Other hypotheses about the role of the decision to grant
an incentive award find little support in these data.
B. The Level of Incentive Awards
We first discuss absolute level of incentive awards and then address
incentive awards as a fraction of the class recovery.
1. The Amount of Incentive Awards
Given an incentive award, what factors help to explain its level? The
cost-reimbursement view of incentive awards forecasts that costs borne by
representative plaintiffs, as proxied for by the attorneys' costs and expenses,
should be positively associated with the size of the incentive award. High-risk
cases should increase the level of incentive awards, and a negative association
should exist between the number of class members and the level of incentive
awards. The level of incentive awards should also be positively correlated
with the age of the case. In addition, a higher rate of objection to the
settlement should correlate with lower incentive awards. Under the view that
incentive awards promote the class attorneys' interests, higher awards may
result when objectors are present and as the attorneys' fees increase, though
objection might be correlated with increased costs for other reasons. A case's
presence in federal rather than state court, under CAFA's assumptions,
forecasts lower incentive awards. The attorney self-interest hypothesis also
predicts higher awards in cases where the representative plaintiff has significant
66. Class action recoveries vary substantially in cases involving statutory fee-shifting as
compared to common funds. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 13. In simple analysis, as reported
supra at text following note 56, and in regression models, we found no meaningful association
between the applicability of a fee-shifting statute and the grant of an incentive award.
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holdout power, as in employment discrimination cases. Under the reward-
for-service hypothesis, incentive awards should increase as attorneys' fees
decrease, holding constant the size of the class recovery. This hypothesis also
predicts higher incentive awards in high-risk cases and lower incentive awards
when objectors to the settlement are present. Under the proportionality
hypothesis, total incentive awards should increase as the awards for attorneys'
fees and for counsels' costs and expenses increase, and as the total and median
class recoveries increase.
Preliminarily, we note that aggregate incentive awards in a case vary
across case categories. Table 5's total-award columns, the first three numerical
columns, show summary statistics for the total incentive award by case
category. The median total award ranges from about $546,000 in employment
discrimination cases to about $1000 in consumer credit cases. Table 5's
average-award columns show summary statistics for the average of incentive
awards in a case. The median average award ranges from about $31,000 in
employment discrimination cases (but note that there are only six cases) to about
$1000 in consumer credit cases. Case categories have similar award patterns
when the average incentive award in a case replaces the total incentive
award. The analysis here focuses on the total incentive award in a case.
Class Action Incentive Awards 1333
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Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. The "mean within case total award" is the sum of incentive awards
within a case, then averaged over all cases in the category. The "median within case
total award" is the sum of incentive awards within a case, with the median then com-
puted using all cases in the category. The "mean within case average award" is the
average of incentive awards within a case, then averaged over all cases in the category.
The "median within case average award" is the median of incentive awards within a
case, then averaged over all cases in the category. No civil rights or tax refund case
had useable total incentive-award data. No civil rights, products liability, or tax
refund case had useable average incentive-award data. Amounts are inflation-
adjusted 2002 dollars.
The cost-reimbursement view suggests that incentive-award levels
increase with the representative plaintiffs costs. As noted above, our proxy
for costs are the costs and expenses awarded to attorneys. The proportionality
view suggests that incentive-award levels will increase with the recovery per
class member. Figure 3 shows the relationships between the total incentive
award in a case and (1) the award to class counsel for costs and expenses, and
(2) recovery per class member for that case's category. The figure shows a
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recoveries. Conditional on an incentive award having been granted, as
recoveries per class member increase and as the award for costs and expenses
increases, incentive awards increase as well.
Figure 3. Relation Between Incentive Awards, Recovery, and Costs




Coss and exene (log 10)
xx
s 2 24 3 36 4
Median class-member recovery (log 10)
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43,
at 1549.
Note. Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
Under the reward-for-performance view, cases with high risk should
have higher incentive awards than other cases. Cases with objectors to the
settlement should have lower incentive awards under this view. Figure 4 is
an interquartile plot showing the relation between total incentive awards and
both case risk and the presence of objectors. High-risk cases are strongly and
significantly associated with higher awards (p < .001). But cases with objectors
to the class settlement also have higher incentive awards (p < .001). We do
not find a similar, consistently significant association between the level of
incentive awards and case age or the number of class members."7
67. The correlation coefficient for total incentive awards in a case and the number of class
members is small, .036, and insignificant (p = .757). The correlation coefficient for total
incentive awards in a case and a case's age (log) is .311 (p = .004). But in regression models
analogous to models (1) and (2) in Table 6, in which age (log) is used as an explanatory variable
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Not high risk High risk
- 0
No objector Objector
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
Regression models again allow the simultaneous exploration of the influ-
ences of costs, class recovery, per-class-member recovery, risk status, and
objector presence on the amount of incentive awards. Table 6 reports the
results. All three models use each case's total incentive award (log) as the
dependent variable.
instead of costs, the coefficient for age is not significant (p = .126 in the analog to model (1) and
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Table 6. Regression Models of the Amount of Incentive Awards
Median class-member recovery (log 10)
Attorneys' costs and expenses (log 10)
High-risk case
Employment discrimination case
Objection to settlement filed
Gross recovery (log)
Ratio: costs to recovery
Constant
(1) (2) (3)

















Robust t statistics in parentheses











Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. Median class-member recoveries are from Eisenberg & Miller, supra note
43, at 1549. Standard errors are computed based on clustering by case category. The
clustering models fit the data better than models using dummy variables for case cate-
gories. Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
Model (1) shows that each of attorneys' costs and expenses, median
class-member recovery, high-risk case status, the employment discrimination
dummy variable, and the presence of an objection to settlement is associated
with higher incentive awards. High-risk status, employment discrimination,
and the presence of an objection are significant in all three models. Model (2)
shows that the attorneys' costs variable becomes insignificant when included
in a model with gross recovery. This is due to the strong multicollinearity in
the model that results from including highly correlated variables. The
correlation coefficient for costs and gross recovery is 0.85 (p < .0001)
compared to 0.52 (p < .0001) for the correlation between costs and median
class-member recovery. Model (1) thus may more precisely represent the influ-
ence of costs, but the choice between model (1) and model (2) is not clear. A
similar problem affects models, not reported here, that include costs and
Class Action Incentive Awards 1337
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attorneys' fees (correlation coefficient 0.87 (p < .0001)).61 Model (3), which
uses the cost-recovery ratio variable featured in the logistic regression models of
the decision to grant an award, is less satisfactory than the other models. The
coefficient on the cost-recovery variable is insignificant and the model explains
substantially less of the variance than models (1) and (2). In models not
reported here, we found no significant effect of the case's federal- or state-
court status or the age of the case.
Models-not reported here-limited to median class-member recovery
and costs as explanatory variables suffer from violation of the assumptions of
ordinary least squares regression.69 Both theoretical and modeling considerations
thus support adding employment discrimination, high-risk, and objector-
presence variables. Employment cases likely have distinctive nonmonetary
costs, and high-risk cases may warrant a premium for representative plaintiffs as
well as for class counsel.
Both the cost-recovery and proportionality hypotheses receive support from
model (1)'s significant variable for attorneys' costs and expenses. The significant
high-risk variable provides support for both the reward-for-perfonnance and the
cost-recovery hypotheses. The significant median-recovery variable provides
support for the proportionality hypothesis. The significance of the objector
dummy variable supports the attorney self-interest hypothesis but is at odds
with the reward-for-performance hypothesis (subject to the qualification that
the presence of an objection may correlate with increased costs for other
reasons). The significant employment discrimination variable provides support
for the cost-reimbursement and attorney self-interest hypotheses.
2. Incentive Awards as a Percent of the Class Recovery
The shares of total class recovery and of costs devoted to incentive
awards is also of interest. Table 7 shows the percent of the total class recovery
paid in incentive awards. The table shows that the total of incentive awards
in a case comprises a mean of 0.16 percent of the total recovery across all case
68. These strong correlations among class recovery, attorneys' fees, and costs support the
use of multi-equation models, such as that reported in infra Table 9. In that model, the significant
effects reported in model (1) of Table 6 largely survive, with the exception of the significant
coefficient on median class-member recovery.
69. Heteroskedasticity (nonconstant variance) is a problem (p = .0007 for a model with total
incentive awards (log) as the dependent variable) and an unsatisfactory pattern of residuals
emerges. Addition of dummy variables for employment discrimination cases and high-risk cases
(model (1)) improve the model. A test for heteroskedasticity in model (1) yields p = .336, so one
cannot reject the hypothesis of constant variance. In addition, one cannot reject the hypothesis
of normally distributed residuals (Shapiro-Wilk test for normality yields p = .910).
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categories. The median is 0.02 percent. In many case categories, the mean
and median total of incentive awards are less than 0.01 percent of the class
recovery. Only in employment discrimination cases does the total of incentive
awards on average exceed 0.1 percent of the class recovery, but the
employment discrimination results are substantially influenced by four
$300,000 awards in one of the cases in the sample.0














































Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
The cost-reimbursement and proportionality hypotheses suggest that
incentive awards, like attorneys' fees, will consume a decreasing percentage of
the class recovery as the class recovery amount increases and a decreasing
percentage of costs as the costs increase. Figure 5 shows the relation between
the portion of the recovery dedicated to incentive awards, and the gross
recovery and the award of counsels' costs and expenses.
The top graph shows a clear decline in the incentive-award share as the
recovery increases. Larger aggregated actions allow nonrepresentative plaintiffs
to receive larger recoveries after deducting representative plaintiffs' incentive
awards. Figure 5 also shows the distinctive pattern in employment
discrimination cases, the only cases textually labeled in the figure. Employment
discrimination cases uniformly have high shares of the recovery dedicated to
incentive awards. This is consistent with the theory that employment
discrimination case class representatives bear unusually high costs. Similarly,
70. Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 694 (N.D. Ga. 2001); see also supra note 42.
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the bottom graph in Figure 5 shows a decline in the incentive-award share as
the costs increase. It shows that employment discrimination cases tend to
have incentive awards that constitute a relatively high share of costs.
0 Figure 5. Incentive-Award Portion of Recovery and: (1) Gross Recovery, (2) Attorneys' Costs
* '~ Emnployment &c.
Employment dc.
0 * # o~ e.  * .. .
u6 8 10
Claiss recovery (log 10) $ 2002
'0 c?
, O
Costs (log 10) $ 2002
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. The y-axis variable is a logit transformation (ln(y/(1-y))) of the proportion
of the recovery constituting incentive awards. Costs are attorneys' costs and
expenses. Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
Table 8 reports regression models that assess the relation between the
portion of the recovery dedicated to incentive awards and (1) the total recovery
and (2) costs. The dependent variable in all models is the total of incentive
awards in a case, transformed as appropriate for proportion data.71 Models (1)
and (2) use the class recovery as an explanatory variable. Models (3) to (6)
use the award of attorneys' costs and expenses as an explanatory variable. All
six models show a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the
gross-recovery variable or the costs-and-expenses variable, as suggested by
Figure 5. Models (2), (4), (5), and (6) add an employment discrimination
dummy variable and/or a high-risk-case dummy variable. As suggested by
Figure 5, employment discrimination cases are positively and significantly
71. The logit transformation of the dependent variable is ln(y/(1-y)). See RAYMOND H.
MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN REGRESSION WITH APPLICATIONS 198 (1986).
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associated with incentive awards absorbing a larger share of the recovery. The
high-risk-case dummy variable indicates that courts tend to enhance
incentive awards in riskier cases. Additional models, not reported here,
indicate that neither the presence of objectors nor the case being in federal
court is associated with the percent of recovery going to incentive awards.
Table 8. Regression Models of Incentive Award
as Percent of Class Recovery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable = incentive award proportion of recovery
(logit transformation)
Gross recovery (log) -1.052** -1.263"*
(5.13) (9.65)
Employment 2.330** 2.753** 2.573**
discrimination case
(11.46) (11.91) (12.05)
High-risk case 0.989** 1.026** 0.848**
(3.90) (4.68) (3.36)
Attorneys' costs and -0.977** -1.092** -1.137** -1.222**
expenses (log 10)
(3.96) (4.75) (6.65) (6.68)
Constant 1.091 2.184* -0.961 -0.582 -0.283 -0.014
(0.90) (2.73) (0.80) (0.51) (0.31) (0.02)
Observations 80 80 68 68 68 68
Adjusted R-squared 0.39 0.57 0.28 0.33 0.42 0.45
Robust t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. The dependent variable is a logit transformation (ln(y/(1-y))) of the
proportion of the recovery constituting incentive awards. Standard errors are computed
based on clustering by case category. The clustering models fit the data better than
models using dummy variables for case categories. Amounts are inflation-adjusted
2002 dollars.
C. Additional Modeling Considerations
It is unrealistic to expect that a single equation captures the relations
among the key variables studied here. For example, the incentive-award level
modeled in Table 6 is in part a function of the award of attorneys' costs and
expenses. But these awards are not determined exogenously. They may be a
function of the case's age and the recovery. Similarly, the median class-member
recovery, an explanatory variable in model (1) of Table 6, is likely related to
the gross recovery and the number of class members. As in our earlier work
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on class action opt-outs and objections, any single-equation model likely will
suffer from endogeneity. 2 A model incorporating a system of equations may
be more appropriate than single-equation models. Such a model can at least
serve as a check on the plausibility of our core results.
To address these issues, we use three-stage least squares" to estimate a
system of three equations, as follows:
(1) a structural equation, modeling the incentive-award level as a func-
tion of costs, median class-member recovery, risk, objector presence, and
employment discrimination case status (this is model (1) in supra Table 6);
(2) costs as a function of a case's gross recovery and age; and
(3) median class-member recovery as a function of employment discrimi-
nation case status, gross class recovery, and number of class members. We
recognize that many other formulations of the equation system may be
reasonable' 4 Table 9 reports this system of equations simultaneously estimated
using three-stage least squares.
72. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43, at 1553.
73. See generaUy WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 339, 378 (5th ed. 2003)
(discussing strengths and weaknesses of various simultaneous equations models).
74. For example, a model replacing gross recovery with attorneys' fees in the second and
third equations in Table 9 yields essentially the same results as the model reported in Table 9.
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Table 9. Three-Stage Least Squares Model of Incentive Awards
(1) (2) (3)
Endogenous variables =
Total incentive Costs (log 10) Median class-
award (log 10) member recovery
(log 10)
Costs (log 10) 0.479**
(2.59)
Median class-member recovery 0.072
(log 10)
(0.22)
High-risk case 0.33 1*
(2.49)
Objection to settlement filed 0.288**
(2.60)
Employment discrimination case 0.849+ 0.795*
(1.92) (2.47)
Gross recovery (log) 0.764** 0.530**
(13.06) (6.64)
Age (log years) 0.216*
(2.50)
Number of class members (log 10) -0.351**
(3.27)
Constant 1.181** -0.168 0.555
(2.73) (0.42) (1.13)
Observations 59 59 59
R-squared 0.68 0.77 0.58
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. Costs are attorneys' costs and expenses. Median class-member recoveries
and number of class members are from Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43, at 1549,
Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
The results are largely consistent with earlier estimates of incentive
awards. As in Table 6, costs, risk, employment discrimination status, and the
presence of an objector to settlement are statistically significantly or margin-
ally statistically significantly associated with increased incentive awards. The
median class-member recovery variable noticeably declines in strength and
statistical significance, but some of the influence of recovery-level and recovery-
level per member is accounted for in the second and third equations in the
system by the presence of the "gross recovery" and "number of class members"
variables. In the middle equation, costs are, as expected, highly correlated with
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both a case's age and the gross class recovery. The median class-member
recovery is significantly associated with the gross class recovery, the number
of class members, and employment discrimination case status."
In addition to the endogeneity problem, another concern is that the
selection of cases in which incentive awards are observed is not random.
Only about one-quarter of reported cases report incentive awards, and the
pattern of observed award levels might be influenced by the selection mecha-
nism.76 To address this concern, we evaluate a selection model in which the
decision to grant an incentive award is modeled simultaneously with the level
of the incentive award. We used leading models from Table 4 (for whether
an incentive award was granted) and Table 6 (for the level of the award).
Table 10 reports the results. It indicates that all core results survive when a
selection-model methodology is used.77 The insignificance of p (rho) (p = 0.711)
reported in the selection model indicates that it is reasonable to analyze the
incentive-award decision and the incentive-award amount in separate models.
75. Adding employment discrimination status to the middle equation (costs) yields an
insignificant coefficient.
76. See generally James Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 47
ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979).
77. Another possible modeling strategy is to include both cases with incentive awards and
without incentive awards in a single equation and to enter the value of the incentive award in the
many cases without awards as zero. Precedent exists for modeling case outcomes in this manner,
but it is questionable in the face of lognormally distributed nonzero values and so many zero
values. Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting Damages: An Empirical Exploration of Sexual Harassment
Awards, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2006). For the data in this Article, the tobit model fits
the cases with incentive awards poorly compared to: (1) Table 6's regression models, (2) Table 9 's
multiple-equation models, and (3) Table 10's selection model.
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Table 10. Heckman Selection Model of the Decision to Grant an Incentive
Award and the Amount of the Incentive Award
(1) (2)
Total incentive award Incentive award
(log 10) granted
Median class-member recovery (log 10) 0.315**
(2.25)




Employment discrimination case 0.479*
(2.26)
Objector to settlement filed 0.392**
(3.50)






Observations 161 censored, 230
69 uncensored
Wald test of independence of equations (p 0): chi-squared(1) = 0.14;
probability > chi-squared = 0.711
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source. Reported class actions, 1993-2002.
Note. Median class-member recoveries are from Eisenberg & Miller, supra note
43, at 1549. Standard errors are computed based on clustering by case category.
Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
D. Limitations
In interpreting our results, a first question is whether our findings should be
regarded as limited to the published opinions studied or might be representative
of the larger mass of class actions. This study's findings from published opinions
are reasonably consistent with the findings by Willging et al. in a 1996 study of
all class actions in four federal districts, a dataset not limited to opinions available
online. They report finding incentive awards in 44 of 126 cases"8 (34.9 percent),
compared to our finding of awards in 104 of 374 cases (27.8 percent). The differ-
ence in incentive-award rates is not statistically significant (p = .143 using Fisher's
78. FJC REPORT, supra note 33, at 120 fig.16.
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exact test). Thus, while our sample of published opinions is not a random or
complete sample of class actions, its rate of reported incentive awards does not
materially differ from the rate in the most detailed report that does not depend
on published-opinion methodology. It may be that the actual rate of awards in
our cases is somewhat higher than observed because courts need not always report
the grant of an incentive award. If that is the case, then our sample likely under-
states the importance of incentive awards compared to the mass of class actions.
With respect to incentive-award levels, Wiliging et al. report median
awards of $7500, $12,000, $7500, and $17,000 for four districts. 9 The median
total incentive award in our sample was $18,191, which is not strikingly different
from Willging et al.'s findings. Willging et al. further report that the median
percentage of the total settlement that was awarded to class representatives "was
less than or equal to eleven thousandths of one percent (0.011%) in all four
districts."8 In our data, the median percentage paid in incentive payments was
0.02 percent of the recovery. Again, our results, based on a sample three times
the size of the earlier study and more diverse in time and locale, are reasonably
consistent with the study of all filings in four districts. Based on the consistency
with Willging et al., this study's findings appear to offer reasonable, cumulative
evidence of the core pattern of incentive awards. Like the earlier study, we find a
substantial rate of grants of incentive awards, median incentive awards in the low
thousands, and incentive awards consuming a small fraction of total recoveries.
But there is a respect in which this study's sample is not representative of
the mass of cases. The monetary stakes of disputes that result in published
opinions likely exceed the stakes of the mass of cases.8 Judges do not randomly
decide what rulings to publish.82 Presumably they choose their more important
cases, and importance likely correlates with monetary stakes.
Comparison of our data with the Willging and Wheatman 2005 FJC study
indicates that the stakes of cases in our database are higher than the stakes of the
mass of class actions. The median recovery for the 374 cases studied here was
$11.2 million in 2002 dollars. Willging and Wheatman describe the recoveries
in their large study of class actions, unfiltered by publication, as follows:
Overall, 142 (23%) of the named cases led to a class-wide monetary
recovery or settlement; attorneys estimated the amount of recovery in
120 of those cases. The typical recovery or settlement was $800,000;
79. Id. at 121 fig.17.
80. Id. at 26.
81. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW, a New
Capping System, and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 387, 413-16.
82. See generally Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What
Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001).
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25% of the attorneys reported recoveries and settlements of $5.2 mil-
lion or more; and 25% reported $50,000 or less.83
Our database clearly has higher awards than the mass of class action
cases. Because we find no association between class-recovery size and the grant
of an award, the similarity of the rate at which incentive awards were granted
in the two databases is not surprising. But we do find that incentive awards
increase with the size of class recoveries. One would therefore expect that
the incentive awards should be higher in our data than in the Willging and
Wheatman data.' Yet we find our median awards, if anything, lower than
the Willging and Wheatman median award. The absolute level of the
difference is not high but the results from the two studies suggest that the
positive association between class recovery and incentive awards is not uni-
form throughout the entire distribution of class action recoveries.
Another limitation of our study is that some calculations for several case
categories are based on relatively few cases. Calculations of recoveries per
class member, incentive-award rates, and incentive-award levels often have
fewer than ten cases in a case category. While our aggregated results are
likely to be stable, case-category-specific results likely are more variable and
might not be expected to be uniformly replicated in other samples.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our results suggest a degree of coherence
and modesty in the pattern of incentive awards. The awards are not always
given but do tend to be given in cases where the economics of the case might
most call for an award. The size of the award generally consumes a trivial
portion of the class recovery and tends to be modest in the vast majority of
cases, with some evidence of substantial awards in employment dis-
crimination cases where large awards may be most justifiable. Courts' general
performance in this area seems to support continued discretion to grant or
deny incentive awards based on the facts of each case. A flat rule such as the
PSLRA's ban on payments to class representatives not only is not clearly sup-
ported but may be counterproductive. The large-scale investors that Congress
hoped to have serve as class representatives after the PSLRA may be the inves-
tors most sensitive to recovering their opportunity and other costs if they do serve.
Therefore, to the extent these sought-after representatives are discouraged from
serving by the anti-incentive-award rule, the rule may compete with the perhaps
more important goal of securing sophisticated and large representative plaintiffs.
83. WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 44, at 51.
84. Incentive-award amounts totaled $49,000 and $48,000 in the two class actions for
which Hensler et al. report incentive-award amounts. See supra notes 38-40.
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CONCLUSION
Incentive awards are given in a nontrivial fraction, but still a minority
(27.8 percent), of class action settlements. Across all case categories, when
an incentive award was granted, the average total award was $128,803 and
the median total award was $18,190. Awards were typically split among more
than one representative plaintiff.85 The average award per class representative
was $15,992 and the median award per class representative was $4357.
Overall, incentive awards constitute such a small fraction of class action settle-
ments that their effect on distributions to class members is de minimus.
Award rates vary by case category. They are frequently granted in con-
sumer credit and employment discrimination cases.
The relation between the award of attorneys' costs and expenses and
median class-member recovery helps explain the decision to grant incentive
awards across the full sample of cases, with the likelihood of an incentive
award increasing as the ratio of costs and expenses to recovery increases.
Some evidence exists that incentive awards are more frequently made (but
not higher) in federal court than in state court.
The level of incentive awards varies with the awards for attorneys' costs and
expenses, and also is positively related to the overall class recovery. Incentive
awards are higher in high-risk cases and higher when an objector is present.
Awards are especially high in employment discrimination cases. Incentive
awards decline as a percent of the class recovery as the class recovery increases.
The data support the hypothesis that courts determine the existence and
level of incentive awards with a view to compensating the representative
plaintiff for the unreimbursed costs of acting as class champion. The data
also tend to support the notion that courts seek to achieve a rough sense of
proportion in case outcomes, with incentive fees varying with the size of the
class recovery and also with the class counsels' fee and the award of costs and
expenses. The data provide some, but conflicting, support for the hypothesis
that incentive awards serve the self-interest of class counsel or that they are
adjusted to reward the representative plaintiff for superior service to the class.
With many courts granting incentive awards and little evidence of
excessive or abusive awards, Congress's decision to ban incentive awards in
private securities fraud cases may be poorly considered. Outside the private
securities litigation context, courts seem to be policing the grants of incentive
85. We could ascertain the number of plaintiffs dividing an incentive award in eighty-nine
cases. In fifty-nine (66.3 percent) of those cases more than one plaintiff received an award. In
forty-four (49.4 percent) of the cases more than two plaintiffs received an award.
1348 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1303 (2006)
HeinOnline -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1348 2005-2006
Class Action Incentive Awards 1349
awards reasonably. The institutional investors that Congress hoped to lure as
class representatives likely incur significant opportunity costs and may be dis-
couraged from serving if they cannot receive adequate compensation.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1, as previously reported,86 shows, by case category, the
mean and median recovery per class member in class action cases.













































Source. Reported Class Actions, 1993-2002; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note
43, at 1549.
Note. Amounts are inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars.
86. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 43, at 1549 tbl.2. Table 2 has a typographical error for
the number of mass tort cases included in the "Recovery Per Class Member" column. Id. The
correct number, eight, is reported in Appendix Table 1 of this Article.
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Source. Reported Class Actions, 1993-2002; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note
43, at 1549.
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